The article advances the view that social and economic choices in societies can reasonably adjust as the age structure of the population changes; in particular, some of the bounty of longer lives can reasonably be allocated to prolonging the labor force participation of older workers. Data on reductions in mortality and, in some countries, declines in disability are presented in ways that help to clarify that prolonged working lives may be a natural concomitant of living longer. The article reviews the problems inherent in the combination of living longer and reducing labor force participation at older ages. It discusses two ways to facilitate longer working lives: (1) eliminating penalties on work at older ages-inherent in the provisions of the social security programs in many countries-that induce older persons to leave the labor force at younger ages; and (2) correcting a false rationale-the "boxed economy" view of the labor market-that is often used to support retention of the provisions that induce older persons to leave the labor force.
he changing demographic environment over the past four or fi ve decades represents both an achievement and a problem. The achievement is that mortality rates have declined and life expectancy has increased substantially in industrialized countries. The problem is that declining birth rates and fewer young people, together with longer lives, have meant that the proportion of old to young is increasing. As the number of older persons increases, health care costs will rise, not only because of the increase in the number of older people, but also because advancing technology will likely create better and perhaps more expensive health care treatments. And while the cost of public pension (social security) programs rises, there will be fewer workers in the labor force to pay for these increasing social security and health care costs. The problem has been magnifi ed by the departure of workers from the labor force at younger ages along with substantial increases in the number of years they spend in retirement. In this article, I advance the view that social and economic choices in societies can reasonably adjust as the age structure of the population changes. In particular, I argue that some of the bounty of longer lives can reasonably be allocated to prolonging the labor force participation of older workers.
In the fi rst section of this article, I present data on reductions in mortality and, in some countries, declines in disability in ways that help clarify that prolonged working lives may be a natural concomitant of living longer. In the second section, I briefl y review the problems inherent in the combination of living longer and reducing labor force participation at older ages. The next section discusses ways to facilitate longer working lives: fi rst, I discuss the penalties on work at older ages-inherent in the provisions of the social security programs in many countries-that induce older persons to leave the labor force. My aim is to draw attention to policy reforms that can eliminate incentives to leave the labor force. Second, I draw attention to a critical false rationale-the "boxed economy" view of the 60 N e t h e r l a n d s D e n m a r k S w e d e n I t a l y C a n a d a B e l g i u m S p a i n U n i t e d S t a t e s G e r m a n y U n i t e d K i n g d o m F r a n c e J a p a n A v e r a g e Percentage Facilitating Longer Working Lives S133 8% had died by 2000. A similar relationship exists in the United Kingdom, as revealed by research based on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). There are several ways to describe mortality. One is to use mortality rates at given ages, say at 50, 55, 60, 65, and 70. Another, perhaps more informative approach is to compare over time the age at which some proportion of persons are in the last two years of life. For example, Banks et al. (2009) showed that in the United Kingdom, 5% of men were in the last two years of life at age 61 in 1960 (see Figure 2 ). By 2005, not until age 70 were 5% of men in their last two years of life. For women, 5% were in their last two years of life at age 68 in 1960, but not until age 75 in 2005. Thus, by this measure, one might say that men in 2005 were like men who were nine years younger in 1960; women in 2005 were like women who were seven years younger in 1960.
A more continuous version of such comparisons is to ask how old one would have to be in subsequent years to have the same mortality as a person of a given age in an earlier year. Figure 3 , also for the United Kingdom and taken from Banks et al. (2009) , shows a comparison of mortality rates at specifi c ages in 1961-2007 with mortality rates of those aged 60 and 65 in 1960. For example, persons aged 72.5 in 2007 had the same mortality rate as persons at age 65 in 1960.
A more direct measure of the change in disability status over time is the proportion of persons who report a given health status. Figure 4 , taken from Cutler, Liebman, and Smyth (2006) , shows the share of men who reported that they were in fair or poor health in the mid-1990s and in the mid-1970s. In the mid-1970s, about 25% of 59-year-old men said that they were in fair or poor health. But in the mid-1990s, not until age 69 did 25% of men report that they were in fair or poor health, a difference of 10 years.
There is substantial additional evidence of declining disability in the United States among persons older than 65. Using data from the National Long-Term Care Survey, 20  24  28  32  36  40  44  48  52  56  60  64  68  72 Age Percentage 59 to 69
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Facilitating Longer Working Lives S135 Manton, Gu, and Lamb (2006) showed that in each of three age intervals-65-74, 75-84, and 85 and older-there has been a large decline since 1982 in the percentage of older people who need help with activities of daily living. But Martin et al. (2007 Martin et al. ( , 2009 ), examining self-assessed trends in fair/poor health, questioned whether such declines pertain to the younger old in more recent years. Weir (2007) also questioned the decline in health status among the younger old, drawing particular attention to the increase in obesity.
In short, there is substantial evidence that the health status of older persons, as measured by mortality, has improved substantially over the past several decades in industrialized countries. The evidence based on self-assessed health status for the younger old and other measures of health is less clear in the United States, and comparable measures are not available over time in all industrialized countries.
THE CASE FOR PROLONGING WORKING LIVES
As stated earlier, declining birth rates in most countries combined with longer life expectancy is increasing the ratio of old to working-age persons. Thus, there are fewer persons in the labor force to pay increasing social security and health care costs.
How might this increasing imbalance be accommodated? My view is that social and economic choices in societies must adjust as the age structure of the population changes. One such adjustment would take advantage of the gains that have been achieved in longevity to increase the labor force participation of older workers and reduce the number of retirees whom those in the workforce must support.
But the trend in recent decades has been just the opposite. The labor force participation of older persons has been declining (until recently), thus making it more diffi cult for those who are working to support those who are retired. In the United States, for example, time in retirement increased from about 13 years in 1965 to more than 18 years in 2003. In other industrialized countries, the trend has been more extreme. Figure 5 shows the percentage increase in life expectancy at age 65 and the percentage decline in the labor force participation of men aged 60-64 in the 12 countries participating in the International Social Security Project. In all the countries, life expectancy has increased and labor force participation has declined, although there is substantial variation across countries. Japan had the greatest increase in life expectancy and the smallest decrease in labor force participation. France is at the other extreme, with a 37% increase in life expectancy but a 77% decline in labor force participation.
In my view, the decline in labor force participation will have to be reversed to reduce the burden on the young of increasing social security and health care costs. Again, some of the bounty of longer lives will have to be allocated to prolonging the labor force participation of older workers. It will not be feasible to use all the increase in longevity to increase years in retirement. What is the gain from prolonged labor force participation? The increase in the labor force participation of older persons will increase production (gross domestic product, GDP). The increase in production will increase tax revenues, which will in turn increase the funds available for social security and health care. An example of the fi scal implications of a reform in Germany is presented in the next section. In addition, personal savings will likely increase with longer working lives. This would essentially happen by default in countries with 401(k)-like personal retirement accounts, as in the United States.
FACILITATING LONGER WORKING LIVES

Social Security Incentives to Retire Early
The evidence presented in this section is based on a set of coordinated studies conducted by analysts in each of the 12 countries in the International Social Security Project. Researchers who have participated in the project are listed on the following page, with authors of the papers in the most recent volume (discussed in section four) listed fi rst, followed by others who have participated in earlier phases (shown in italics 
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The decline in the labor force participation of older persons is perhaps the most dramatic feature of labor force change over the past several decades. The decline was most dramatic between the 1960s and the mid-1990s. Since then, the labor force participation of older men has increased somewhat in each of the 12 countries in the International Social Security Project. The decline in the earlier period was striking in all but one of the countries. In the early 1960s, the participation rates were above 70% in each of the countries and above 80% in several countries. By the mid-1990s, the rate had fallen to below 20% in Belgium, Italy, France, and the Netherlands. It had fallen to about 35% in Germany and 40% in Spain. Although analysts have often emphasized the "dramatic" decline in labor force participation in the United States, the decline from 82% to 53% is modest in comparison with the much more precipitous decline in these European countries. The decline to 57% in Sweden was also large but modest when compared with the decline in other countries. Japan stands out with the smallest decline of all the countries studied, from about 83% to 75%.
The measure of the effect of social security provisions on retirement developed in the fi rst phase of the International Social Security Project is called the implicit social security tax on work. To understand this measure, it is useful to think of wage compensation for working an additional year in two components: the fi rst is wage earnings, and the second is the "increase" in the expected present discounted value of promised future social security benefi ts. It is natural to think of the difference between these two components as positive, or at least not negative. That is, if a person works for an additional year and thus forgoes one year of benefi ts, it might be expected that benefi ts begun one year later would be increased enough to offset the fact that they are received for one fewer years. This is true, for example, for the typical worker in the United States: if a worker forgoes claiming benefi ts at the earliest possible age (62) and works another year, benefi ts in subsequent years are increased by 6.67% to account for the fact that benefi ts will be received for one fewer year.
In most of the countries in the Project, however, the accrual is signifi cantly negative. This is largely a consequence of not increasing benefi ts enough if the age of benefi t receipt is delayed-that is, benefi ts are not "actuarially fair." Thus, the gain in wage earnings is partially, or even mostly, offset by a loss in future social security benefi ts. The ratio of this loss to wage earnings (after tax) is called the social security implicit tax on earnings. In many countries, this tax can be 80% or more at certain ages. To provide a simple summary of the country-specifi c incentives for early retirement, I sum the implicit tax rates on continued work beginning at age 55 or at an early retirement age-when a person is fi rst eligible for social security benefi ts-and running through age 69. This measure, which we call the "tax force to retire," varies from 1.6 in the United States to 9.2 in Italy. The relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of men aged 55-65 who are out of the labor force-sometimes called "unused labor force capacity"-is shown in Figure 6 . There is a striking correspondence between the tax force to retire and unused labor capacity. The dashed line in this fi gure shows the fi t of the data. More than 80% of unused labor capacity is explained by the tax force to retire.
The fi rst phase of the Project established two key results (reported in detail in Gruber and Wise [1999] : (1) the social security systems in many countries provide enormous incentives to leave the labor force at older ages, and (2) there is a strong correspondence between social security incentives to retire and the withdrawal of older workers from the labor force. The implication is that social security incentives to retire are an important cause of the low labor force participation of older workers in many countries. An equally important fi nding from this early work is that a consideration of incentives to retire must include disability insurance and special unemployment insurance programs, as well as social security programs, because these programs often serve as early retirement programs before the social security-stated early retirement age.
The Project also developed estimates of the relationship between social security provisions and retirement, based on analysis of microdata in each country. The key variable in the estimated models was the incentive measure, the option value of continuing work, as set out by Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) . The results (reported in detail in Gruber and Wise [2004] were striking and leave no doubt that social security incentives have a strong effect on retirement decisions and thus have very large effects on the labor force participation of older employees. Perhaps just as important, the estimates showed that the response to these incentive effects is similar in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other social characteristics. Employees in all countries react similarly to social security retirement incentives. It seems clear that the relationship between social security provisions and labor force participation is a causal one.
The fi scal implications of changes in program provisions can be simulated using the estimates from the microestimation. The effects can be substantial. The estimates reported for Germany by Börsch-Supan, Kohnz, and Schnabel (2007) illustrate the potential effects. Germany has a very generous social security system, with strong incentives to retire early. In addition to the social security program per se, a large fraction of workers in Germany retire through disability and unemployment programs, which essentially provide early retirement benefi ts before the age-60 social security early retirement age. Indeed, these programs provide the principal path to retirement in Germany. In addition, after benefi ts are available, there is no actuarial reduction in benefi ts taken before the "normal" retirement age of 65 (although recent reforms have introduced some actuarial reduction). For example, early retirement benefi ts taken at age 60, or benefi ts from the disability program taken at age 57, were the same as the retirement benefi ts at age 65. This provides an enormous incentive to take benefi ts when they are fi rst available. If they are not taken, they are simply lost; there is no offsetting increase in benefi ts if they are received for fewer years.
Suppose that benefi ts in Germany were actuarially fair, so that benefi ts received prior to age 65 were reduced by 6% per year and benefi ts received after 65 were increased 6% per year. What would be the fi scal implication of such a change? The mean retirement age for men under the base provisions was 61.91. An actuarially fair reduction in benefi ts would increase the retirement age by about three years, for both men and women. The fi scal implications of this illustrative reform are determined by the net change in benefi ts minus the change in contributions and taxes due to the reform. The total effect of the reform is decomposed into two parts: the "mechanical" effect that would exist if retirement behavior did not change, and the behavioral effect that is due to changes in retirement decisions. Benefi ts received at any age below 65 are reduced by the actuarial reduction. If there were no change in retirement ages, the average benefi t per worker would be reduced by 37,056 Euros. But the behavioral response to the reform increases the average retirement age, which increases the average benefi t by 19,632 Euros. The total (net) effect on benefi ts is a reduction by 17,423 Euros.
In addition to the change in benefi ts, the reform has further fi scal implications. Contributions to the social security system are increased if employees continue to work. This behavioral effect is +16,766 Euros. In addition, if employees work longer, they pay more in other taxes. The total increase in taxes is 49,049 Euros per worker (including taxes for health and other insurance programs, income taxes, and value added tax). The net change in benefi ts minus the change in contributions and taxes is -83,238 Euros. This net reduction in the total government expenditures minus revenues is equivalent to 42.85% of base benefi ts under the base system. Put another way, the reduction in benefi ts minus all taxes resulting from this reform in Germany would be about 1.2% of GDP. Thus, it is clear that reforms that reduce incentives to retire early may have substantial fi scal implications.
The "Boxed Economy" View of the Labor Market and Retirement Incentives
The original impetus for plan provisions that encouraged older persons to leave the labor force is often unclear. It is now frequently claimed that these provisions were introduced to provide more jobs for the young, assuming that fewer older persons in the labor force would open up more job opportunities for younger workers. The same reasoning is also often used to argue against efforts in these countries to reduce or eliminate incentives for older persons to leave the labor force, claiming that the consequent increase in the employment of older persons would reduce the employment of younger persons. The numerous examples of such arguments include the following:
• "The Job Release Scheme is 'a measure which allows older workers to retire early in order to release jobs for the registered unemployed.'" (The United Kingdom: the 1977 Labour Government.)
• "We will extend the voluntary Job Release Scheme to men over 60 so that those who want to retire early vacate jobs for those who are currently unemployed. This could take as many as 160,000 people out of unemployment and into work." (The United Kingdom: the 1987 Labour Party manifesto.)
• "And I would like to speak to the elders, to those who have spent their lifetime working in this region, and well, I would like them to show the way, that life must change; when it is time to retire, leave the labor force in order to provide jobs for your sons and daughters. That is what I ask you. The Government makes it possible for you to retire at age 55. Then retire, with one's head held high, proud of your worker's life. This is what we are going to ask you…This is the 'contrat de solidarité' [an early retirement scheme available to those aged 55 and older who quit their job]. That those who are the oldest, those who have worked, leave the labor force, release jobs so that everyone can have a job." (France: Pierre Mauroy, French Prime Minister, in Lille 27th September 1981, quoted in Gaullier, Padis, and Théry [1982:230] .)
• "The lowering of the retirement age strengthens the positive effects on employment that early retirement policies made possible. It even widens these positive effects as a larger share of the population is concerned." (France: Ministry of Employment, in La retraite à 60 ans, Droit social n°4 -avril 1983.)
• "Unemployment among the youth is perhaps the most serious problem of today, because we cannot hide from the fact that we risk losing a whole generation of young persons from the labour market and from society as a whole." (Denmark, with respect to the Post Employment Wage: The Minister of Labour, Svend Auken, Proceedings of Parliament, 1978.) In this section, I consider the validity of such claims using evidence from the fourth phase of the International Social Security Project. The results of analyses of the relationship between labor force participation of older and younger persons in the 12 countries in the Project are presented in Gruber and Wise (in press) . I draw in particular on the introduction and summary by Gruber, Milligan, and Wise (2010) .
The proposition that more work by older persons reduces the job opportunities for younger persons is sometimes referred to by economists as the "lump of labor" theory. Taken literally, this theory says that if an additional older worker is employed, one younger worker must be displaced. The implication is that economies are boxed and that the box cannot be enlarged.
I emphasize the relationship between the employment rate of older persons and the unemployment and employment rates of younger persons, in particular youth. I emphasize employment and unemployment rates because public discourse about the relationship is typically in terms of these rates-for example, about whether the unemployment rate of youth will be increased if incentives for older persons to leave the labor force are eliminated.
At fi rst glance, it seems clear that economies are not boxed. The fl ow of women into the labor force in the past few decades has increased the size of the labor force enormously in many countries. For example, the number of women in the labor force in the United States increased by almost 48 million between 1960 and 2007, from about 34% to 46% of the labor force. But the employment rate of men changed little as the proportion of women who were employed increased. More generally, across the 12 Project countries, there is little relationship between the employment rate of men and the increase in the employment rate of women. There was a small decline in the employment rate of men over this time period in all but one of the countries, but on average, the smallest of the small declines were in the countries with the largest increase in the employment rate for women.
Based on the results from the 12 Project countries, I demonstrate in this section several different ways of assessing the relationship between the employment of the old and the employment and unemployment of the young. First, I show how the tax force to retire-emphasized in the fi rst phase of the project-is related to the employment of youth (aged 20-24) and prime-age persons (those aged 25-54). Second, I show illustrative within-country "natural experiment" comparisons that help to demonstrate the relationship between within-country reforms and the consequent changes in the employment of the old and of the young. Third, I discuss cross-country comparisons based on various comparison methods. Fourth, I show more formal estimates based on panel regression analysis. As it turns out, all the various estimation methods yield very consistent results: there is no evidence that reducing the employment of older persons provides more job opportunities for younger persons. And there is no evidence that increasing the labor force participation of older persons reduces the job opportunities of younger persons. Figure 6 shows the strong relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of men who are out of the labor force. If the incentives that reduced the proportion of older persons in the labor force (and increased the proportion out of the labor force) increase the job opportunities of young persons, then the tax force to retire should be related to youth employment. The greater the tax force to retire, the lower youth unemployment should be and the greater youth employment should be. Analogous relationships should be true for prime-age persons, but this is not the case. Figure 7 is the same as Figure 6 but with the addition of the unemployment and employment rates of youth aged 20-24. If the incentives that reduced the proportion of older persons in the labor force increase the job opportunities of young persons, then the tax force to retire should be related to youth employment. The greater the tax force to retire, the lower youth unemployment should be. In fact, however, there is a positive relationship across countries between the tax force for older persons to retire and the unemployment of young men: the greater the tax force to retire, the greater is young men's unemployment. And, if inducing older persons to leave the labor force provides more jobs for the young, then the tax force to retire-which is strongly related to the proportion of older persons who are out of the labor force-should also be strongly related to the employment of youth. In fact, however, the opposite is true. The greater the tax force to retire, the lower the employment rate of youth is. The relationship between the tax force for older persons to leave the labor force and the unemployment and employment of prime-age persons shows similar results. As for youth, the greater the tax force to retire, the greater the unemployment and the lower the employment of prime-age persons is.
In short, these results provide no evidence that inducing older persons to leave the labor force frees up jobs for the young. If anything, the opposite is true: paying for old persons to leave the labor force reduces the employment rate and increases the unemployment rate of youth and persons in their prime-age working years.
A second way to assess the relationship between the employment of the old and the young is to consider within-country "natural experiment" estimates of this relationship. In many instances, it is possible to trace employment trends for both young and older workers before and after a social security reform in a country to examine the relationship between the effect of the reform on older workers and that on younger workers. Such illustrations serve two important purposes. One is simply to demonstrate the effects of reform on the labor force participation of older workers and the corresponding effect on younger persons. The second is to help judge the extent to which the further results (cross-country comparisons and panel regression estimates) shown below are affected by an important issue that complicates estimation of the causal relationship between employment of the old and the young. Suppose-as is now often claimed-that the program provisions that induced older persons to leave the labor force were prompted by increasing youth unemployment. In this case, a decline in youth unemployment following the introduction of retirement incentives could simply have been a continuation of the pre-incentive decline rather than caused by the incentive-induced decline in the employment of older persons. To address this issue, I selected examples that provide a "natural experiment" in which specifi c reforms were apparently not prompted by concerns about youth unemployment (or employment). That is, in these examples, the reform that induced older persons to leave the labor force was exogenous; in other words, they are not contaminated by the endogeneity problem. There is no sure way to correct for the problem, to the extent that it exists. As comparison with subsequent results shows, however, the results of the natural experiment-those not contaminated by endogeneity-are very similar to fi ndings from comparisons in which the extent of endogeneity is less clear. That later results are much like the fi ndings from natural experiments lends credence to the results obtained by other estimation methods.
The 1979 Post Employment Wage (PEW) program in Denmark provides a striking example. It induced an almost immediate 28% drop in the labor force participation rate of men aged 61-65 . Prior to the reform, the employment rate of youth had been increasing, and the unemployment rate of youth had changed little since 1975. Thus, it seems unlikely that the reform was prompted by either a fall in the employment rate or an increase in the unemployment rate of youth. The response to this reform is shown in Figure 8 . Between Reforms over time in Germany provide another example (see Börsch-Supan and Schnabel in press). Before 1972, the social security retirement age in Germany was 65, except for disability, and there was no social security early retirement age. But legislation in 1972 provided for early retirement at age 60 for women and at age 63 for men (given the accumulation of 35 required social security work years). In addition, increased liberal use of disability and unemployment benefi ts effectively expanded the early retirement option. Beginning in 1972 (with further provisions over the next 20 years), social security early retirement benefi ts were made available with no actuarial reduction in benefi ts taken before the normal retirement age. Delayed benefi ts were increased only through years of service, by about 2.2% each year, which is well below an actuarially fair adjustment. The 1972 reform greatly increased the incentive to leave the labor force early. Over the next four years, the employment rate of persons aged 55-64 fell by about 7 percentage points, a decrease of over 17%. Again, it seems clear that this change could not have been motivated by an increase in the unemployment rate of youth, given that this rate had been very low throughout the prior decade and the employment rate of youth had been falling in previous years. However, the adjusted data show essentially no change in either the unemployment rate or the employment rate over the prior six years.
A 1992 reform in Germany introduced actuarial adjustment of benefi ts, to be phased in beginning in 1998. In addition, benefi ts were based on net, rather than gross, wages. Because this reform actually reduced the incentive for older persons to leave the labor force, it could not have been motivated by the desire to provide jobs for the young by inducing older persons to retire. Indeed, the labor force of older persons increased following this What was the effect of these reforms on the employment of youth? A 7-percentage-point reduction in the employment rate of older persons between 1972 and 1976 was associated with a 2-percentage-point reduction in the employment of youth and with a 1.7-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate of youth. The 15-percentage-point increase in the employment rate of older persons following the 1998 actuarial adjustment phase-in was associated with no change, not a decrease, in the employment rate of youth and a slight reduction in their unemployment rate. The results based on the adjusted data are essentially the same. Thus, the effect of these reforms was quite inconsistent with the boxed economy view of the German economy.
In short, these natural experiments are consistent with each other, and neither is consistent with the boxed economy proposition. Other examples, not noted here, tell a similar story.
A third way to assess the relationship between the employment of the young and the old is to consider various cross-country comparisons. For example, in each of the 12 Program countries, the employment o f persons aged 55-64 increased over the last 10 or 15 years. In most countries, the increase began between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, but the beginning date varied from country to country-ranging from 1983 in the United States to 1999 in Italy. In many countries, the increase can be ascribed to a particular reform that limited early retirement, as illustrated in the country-specifi c illustration for Germany. But even if a precipitating reform cannot be narrowly identifi ed, it is implausible that a reform, or other event, that precipitated the increase in the employment of older persons was motivated by a desire to increase the employment-or reduce the unemployment-of youth. Thus, these increases also provide a good natural experiment-not plagued by the endogeneity problem-to judge the effect of the increase in the employment of older persons on the employment of youth.
There are many different ways of presenting the data. Consider the difference in the employment rate of older persons from the beginning of the upturn to the end of the data in each country, together with the difference between the employment rate and unemployment rate of youth. Such a comparison reveals that a greater increase in the employment of older persons is not associated with either a decrease in the employment of youth or an increase in the unemployment of youth. On average across all countries, the increase in the employment of older persons is 0.081 percentage points; the increase in the employment of youth is 0.047 percentage points, and the decrease in the unemployment of youth is -0.026 percentage points. Figure 9 compares the six countries with the smallest increase to the six with the greatest increase in the employment of older persons. Those with the greatest increase in the employment of older persons also had the greatest increase in the employment of youth and the greatest decrease in the unemployment of youth. Estimates based on the change over the same time period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) for all countries show essentially the same result.
The fl ip side of the comparison of upturns across countries is the comparison of downturns. Most downturns were long-term and occurred prior to the upturns. As illustrated in the within-country natural experiments, many of the downturns were precipitated by specifi c reforms, or by a series of reforms. In this case, the countries with the greatest decreases are compared with those with the smallest decreases. The results show that the countries with the greatest decline in the employment of the older age group also have the greatest decline in the employment of the young.
These comparisons similarly show no evidence that reductions in the employment of older persons provide more job opportunities for the young. The results are inconsistent with the boxed economy proposition.
The fourth way to assess the relationship between the employment of the young and old is through panel regressions. Perhaps the most common way to summarize data series across many countries is by way of panel regression estimation. These estimates allow control for country-specifi c attributes that affect the employment and unemployment of the young but that are not included as covariates in the analysis. Although this method presents a concise estimate of results, it is subject to several limitations. First, taken on its own, this method masks the results of natural experiments like those discussed earlier. Second, in the simple specifi cation I have used, the effect of covariates is presumed to be the same in all countries. The results based on adjusted data allow the effects of the covariates on each of the employment time series to vary from country to country. It is clear that the effect of the covariates differs from country to country. Third, judging by the natural experiment segments in the data, it seems evident that the most relevant year intervals for comparison-whether differences, percentage changes, or another measureare not common to all countries.
I present panel estimates based on several specifi cations. The key right-hand variable is the employment rate of persons aged 55-64. I also control directly for GDP, the growth in GDP, and the proportion of the economy in manufacturing. In addition I include countryspecifi c effects, which control for country-specifi c attributes that, in addition to the covariates, affect the employment and the unemployment of youth. I also include year effects that capture attributes that are common to all countries in a given year. Table 1 shows the estimated effect of the employment of persons aged 55-64 on the unemployment and the employment of youth aged 20-24 and on the unemployment and employment of prime-age persons. The table also shows the estimated effect of the employment of older persons on the proportion of youth in school. Estimates are reported for several specifi cations and are shown with and without controlling for GDP per capita, growth in GDP, and the manufacturing proportion. The key result is that in each specifi cation but one, an increase in the employment of older persons is estimated to decrease the unemployment rate of youth (and prime-age persons) and to increase the employment rate of youth (and prime-age persons). Each estimate is statistically different from zero. The only estimate that does not follow this pattern is the estimated effect of employment of older persons on the unemployment rate of youth in the "three-year lag on elderly" specifi cation, with controls; in this case, the estimated effect is not statistically different from zero.
More precisely, with respect to the unemployment of youth, the estimates for youth suggest this: with controls, a 1-percentage-point increase in the employment of older persons changes the unemployment rate of youth between +0.11 and -0.23 percentage points; without controls, the decrease in unemployment is between 0.09 and 0.44 percentage points. For the log difference specifi cation with controls, a 1% increase in the employment Five-year diff erence specifi cation above but the logarithm of unemployment, for example, in a given year is compared with the logarithm of unemployment fi ve years earlier. In this case, the estimates represent the percentage diff erence in the unemployment of youth associated with a percentage diff erence in the employment of older persons. of older persons is associated with a 0.91% decrease in the unemployment rate of youth; without controls, the decrease is 1.87%.
With respect to the employment of youth, and with controls, a 1-percentage-point increase in the employment of older persons increases the employment rate of youth between 0.54 and 0.91 percentage points; without controls, the increase is between 0.32 and 0.84 percentage points. For the log difference specifi cation with controls, a 1% increase in the employment of older persons is associated with a 0.49% increase in the unemployment rate of youth; without controls, the increase is 0.61%. Comparable estimates for prime-age persons are shown in the table.
The estimates for each specifi cation also indicate that an increase in the employment of older persons is associated with a decrease in the schooling of youth, with each estimate signifi cantly different from zero. Across all specifi cations, a 1-percentage-point increase in the employment of older persons reduces the proportion of youth in school by between 0.17 and 0.70 percentage points. A 1% increase in the employment of older persons is associated with about a 0.70% reduction in the proportion of youth aged 20-24 in school. This result is consistent with fi ndings elsewhere that the greater the employment rate of youth (or the greater their opportunity for employment), the lower their rates of school attendance will be.
In short, the panel regression results are consistent with the "natural experiment" results and with results based on increasing and decreasing employment intervals for older persons. The fi ndings provide no support for the boxed economy proposition. Indeed, the weight of the evidence suggests that increasing the employment of older persons provides more job opportunities for younger persons and reduces their unemployment rate. The positive relationship is not consistent with the boxed economy proposition. We have not, however, emphasized the possible mechanisms-such as lower earnings tax rates-that could produce the positive relationship.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this article, I argued that given large declines in mortality rates over the past four or fi ve decades, it seems reasonable to suggest that working lives might also be prolonged. This seems especially true given the aging of societies and the likely large increases in social security and health care costs. One way to help cover these increasing costs is to prolong the number of years that people spend in the labor force. In the past three or four decades, however, the trend has been just the reverse. As mortality rates have fallen, older persons (until recently) have retired at younger and younger ages, increasing the number of years in retirement and increasing the burden on the declining proportion of younger persons in the labor force, who must pay the cost of increasing social security and health care costs.
I assume that this trend is not sustainable. To reduce the burden on the young of the increasing social security and health care costs, the decline in the labor force participation of older persons will have to be reversed. Some of the bounty of longer lives will have to be allocated to prolonging the labor force participation of older workers. It will not be feasible to use all of the increase in longevity, and more, to increase years in retirement.
After presenting these arguments, I then considered ways to facilitate longer working lives using evidence based on results from the ongoing International Social Security Project and emphasizing two issues that promote early departure from the labor force and that must be addressed if work at older ages is to be facilitated. The fi rst issue is the penalties inherent in the provisions of the social security programs in many countries that induce older persons to leave the labor force at younger ages. The second is the false "boxed economy" rationale often used to support the provisions that induce older persons to leave the labor force.
On the fi rst issue, the evidence shows that (1) social security systems in many countries provide enormous incentives to leave the labor force at younger ages; (2) there is a strong correspondence between social security incentives to retire and the withdrawal of older workers from the labor force; and (3) disability insurance and special unemployment programs often serve as early retirement programs before the social security early retirement age, and these programs must be taken into account in calculations of the incentive effects of the social security systems.
On the second issue, the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as well as the evidence from each of the several different methods of estimation, is contrary to the boxed economy proposition. I fi nd no evidence that increasing the employment of older persons reduces employment opportunities for youth and no evidence that increasing employment of older persons increases their unemployment. Thus, this view of the labor market should not be used to rationalize the continuation of incentives for older persons to leave the labor force.
In the forgoing analysis, I emphasized declining mortality to suggest that working lives might reasonably be prolonged. I also emphasized that eliminating retirement program incentives to retire early and eliminating the false rationale that helps maintain these incentives would help greatly in facilitating longer working lives. The organization of the discussion in this article is not intended to portray a comprehensive analysis of retirement or of the many determinants of retirement. For example, while declining mortality over the past four or fi ve decades helps to add reason to prolonging working lives, increased incomes-as well as retirement program incentives-have surely contributed to earlier retirement. Now, though, there seems to be good rationale to reverse the trend toward early retirement, whatever the reasons for early retirement may have been.
The evidence summarized pertains to public pension systems, but these are not the only systems that contain incentives to leave the labor force early. Defi ned benefi t systems in the private sector in the United States-and, in particular, the defi ned benefi t plans common in state, local, and federal government-typically contain provisions that strongly encourage early retirement. And while Social Security incentives to retire early based on nonactuarial benefi t adjustments have been largely eliminated, Goda, Slavov (2007a, 2007b) showed that other provisions still discourage work at older ages. In addition, there are other adaptations that might encourage longer working lives. For example, institutional arrangements within fi rms to provide for partial retirement could well prolong work on a part-time basis.
Finally, there are limits on work at older ages; and in all countries, persons with greater self-assessed disability or low health status are more likely to retire early. Policies that reduce the incentives to retire early may also limit the retirement options of persons in poo r health. Thus, any comprehensive analysis of the potential for longer working lives must also consider the limits on work at older ages.
